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mlknchzWhat follows is the result of years of thought and study. It is by no means the definitive (nor even necessarily the correct) analysis of why the US and Coalition Forces are in Iraq, but it does supply a logical set of motivations to what seems to many an illogical situation. It is an analysis, not an apology, nor an agreement with Government policies. It also does not mean that there may not be other goals and objectives the Administration may be seeking.
“The essence of war is violence. Moderation in war is imbecility” - Admiral John Fisher
And yet, in this age, “war in moderation” is all the American public will accept. This is contrary to what is necessary when fighting guerrilla or terrorist forces. Guerrilla or terrorist forces have as their greatest assets mobility, secrecy, and the ability to maintain tactical initiative. They are able to maintain tactical initiative by their ability to blend in with the populace, to disperse at will and concentrate their forces at times of their choosing, and being an offensive, not defensive force. They force their enemies to adopt a defensive posture, and drain their enemy’s resources through the simple attrition of “maintaining alert status”. They are hard to pin down; by their nature they are diffuse. As Mao said “Guerrillas are like fish, and the people are the water in which fish swim.” So it is with terrorists.
Wise tactical doctrine, therefore, is to find a way to fix terrorist or guerilla forces in place, at a place of YOUR choosing, not theirs. By doing so, you take the advantage of tactical initiative away from them. Even if they maintain that at a theatre level, they’ve been deprived of it on a strategic level. They have been forced to fight on YOUR terms, to expend their resources on objectives not of their own choosing.
After 9/11 when al-Qaeda had been identified as the organization responsible for the attack, the administration was left with a very small set of options. They could wait for the next attack, becoming simply reactive. They could pro-actively search, through intelligence channels, for the organization. Or they could attempt to find a way to bring al-Qaeda to the battlefield on their terms.
The first option surrendered tactical initiative to the terrorists, meaning the administration (and the American public as a whole) would have to create and maintain a heightened readiness level in perpetuity, hoping to fend off the attack. High alert levels can only be maintained for a relatively short period of time even with well-trained troops; it’s impossible to do so with a civilian population.
The second, which was, and still is being pursued, for a number of reasons yielded only limited successes.
The third involved attacking and occupying a country within the Moslem world, a place where al-Qaeda would be forced to meet US/Coalition forces head-on on the battlefield. In the complex power-politics of the region, any organization purporting to advance “jihad” would be expected to meet the “infidels”, the “crusaders” (two very powerful terms in Moslem politics) in battle. Failure to do so would have dishonored al -Qaeda, perhaps irreparably. If successful, it was thought that al-Qaeda would be forced to expend its resources THERE instead of in attacks on US/ Coalition soil.
Obviously, this third option could not be revealed for what it truly was. Doing so would allow al-Qaeda to avoid the trap. There was also the risk of the Administration falling into the same trap that befell the Germans at Verdun in the First World War. Verdun was never intended to be anything but a battle which would force the French Army into battle at a place the Germans chose; a place where the Germans had assembled a “meat-grinder” into which the French forces would be fed. It was to be a battle of destruction from which the Germans could disengage when their tactical goal had been met, but at which the French Army could be bled white. What transpired, however, was that once the German forces started taking losses, German public opinion demanded a victory in terms of ground taken, which was never part of the original battle-plan. The Germans were unable to disengage, and ended up suffering much the same losses as the French.
Therefore, there needed to be a cover story for the invasion and occupation of Iraq, and the administration settled on WMDs and Hussein’s notional links to terrorist organizations as this cover story. Without this cover story, American public opinion would not have accepted US military intervention in the region. It also provided a set of faux “benchmarks” or “objectives” which would explain a continued US/Coalition presence in the country that had nothing to do with the real reason for this presence. These allowed US/Coalition forces to be withdrawn at the will of the Administration, thus avoiding the German mistake of 1916.
The administration then moved massive amounts of troops and material into the region, in expectation of turning Iraq into another Verdun, tying up al-Qaeda resources, and bringing al-Qaeda forces to the battlefield where they could be met by conventional US/Coalition military forces.
“The essence of war is violence. Moderation in war is imbecility” - Admiral John Fisher
And yet, in this age, “war in moderation” is all the American public will accept. This is contrary to what is necessary when fighting guerrilla or terrorist forces. Guerrilla or terrorist forces have as their greatest assets mobility, secrecy, and the ability to maintain tactical initiative. They are able to maintain tactical initiative by their ability to blend in with the populace, to disperse at will and concentrate their forces at times of their choosing, and being an offensive, not defensive force. They force their enemies to adopt a defensive posture, and drain their enemy’s resources through the simple attrition of “maintaining alert status”. They are hard to pin down; by their nature they are diffuse. As Mao said “Guerrillas are like fish, and the people are the water in which fish swim.” So it is with terrorists.
Wise tactical doctrine, therefore, is to find a way to fix terrorist or guerilla forces in place, at a place of YOUR choosing, not theirs. By doing so, you take the advantage of tactical initiative away from them. Even if they maintain that at a theatre level, they’ve been deprived of it on a strategic level. They have been forced to fight on YOUR terms, to expend their resources on objectives not of their own choosing.
After 9/11 when al-Qaeda had been identified as the organization responsible for the attack, the administration was left with a very small set of options. They could wait for the next attack, becoming simply reactive. They could pro-actively search, through intelligence channels, for the organization. Or they could attempt to find a way to bring al-Qaeda to the battlefield on their terms.
The first option surrendered tactical initiative to the terrorists, meaning the administration (and the American public as a whole) would have to create and maintain a heightened readiness level in perpetuity, hoping to fend off the attack. High alert levels can only be maintained for a relatively short period of time even with well-trained troops; it’s impossible to do so with a civilian population.
The second, which was, and still is being pursued, for a number of reasons yielded only limited successes.
The third involved attacking and occupying a country within the Moslem world, a place where al-Qaeda would be forced to meet US/Coalition forces head-on on the battlefield. In the complex power-politics of the region, any organization purporting to advance “jihad” would be expected to meet the “infidels”, the “crusaders” (two very powerful terms in Moslem politics) in battle. Failure to do so would have dishonored al -Qaeda, perhaps irreparably. If successful, it was thought that al-Qaeda would be forced to expend its resources THERE instead of in attacks on US/ Coalition soil.
Obviously, this third option could not be revealed for what it truly was. Doing so would allow al-Qaeda to avoid the trap. There was also the risk of the Administration falling into the same trap that befell the Germans at Verdun in the First World War. Verdun was never intended to be anything but a battle which would force the French Army into battle at a place the Germans chose; a place where the Germans had assembled a “meat-grinder” into which the French forces would be fed. It was to be a battle of destruction from which the Germans could disengage when their tactical goal had been met, but at which the French Army could be bled white. What transpired, however, was that once the German forces started taking losses, German public opinion demanded a victory in terms of ground taken, which was never part of the original battle-plan. The Germans were unable to disengage, and ended up suffering much the same losses as the French.
Therefore, there needed to be a cover story for the invasion and occupation of Iraq, and the administration settled on WMDs and Hussein’s notional links to terrorist organizations as this cover story. Without this cover story, American public opinion would not have accepted US military intervention in the region. It also provided a set of faux “benchmarks” or “objectives” which would explain a continued US/Coalition presence in the country that had nothing to do with the real reason for this presence. These allowed US/Coalition forces to be withdrawn at the will of the Administration, thus avoiding the German mistake of 1916.
The administration then moved massive amounts of troops and material into the region, in expectation of turning Iraq into another Verdun, tying up al-Qaeda resources, and bringing al-Qaeda forces to the battlefield where they could be met by conventional US/Coalition military forces.
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no subject
Date: 4/13/08 10:25 pm (UTC)I mean, it's a better rationale than blatant and egregious war profiteering, I guess. And I'd prefer to "believe" yours rather than mine.
no subject
Date: 4/13/08 10:52 pm (UTC)As for cynicism, the argument could be made that it's stopped further attacks on American soil,(at best that's speculative) and kept the bulk of casualties in a place where they're more likely to be "enemy" than "friendly". From a miliary point of view, that's an entirely acceptable outcome.
no subject
Date: 4/13/08 11:05 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 4/13/08 11:10 pm (UTC)excuse my incoherence, preez
Date: 4/13/08 11:11 pm (UTC)What about the idea that the U.S. having a semi-permanent position in the Middle East will do more than any other thing to drive recruitment numbers UP for Al Qaeda? Seems self-defeating to locate a Giant Machine whose main byproduct is populist/religious/nationalist uprisings. How can we grind them down if our very presence creates ever more legions of people to be ground down?
Profiling again...
Date: 4/13/08 11:22 pm (UTC)Very little the US does -other than defeating al-Qaeda- will really effect recruitment to these organizations. The idea is that Moslem Fundamentalist Jihad is not a reaction to US or Western policies, but a continuation of 1400 years of Moslem aggression with the view to the world-wide supremacy of Sharia law.
Re: Profiling again...
Date: 4/13/08 11:39 pm (UTC)I gnow you're just setting forth the assertions made by the military/neocons, and these may or may not be your own feelings, but your second paragraph chills me to the bone. *brr*
Re: Profiling again...
Date: 4/13/08 11:46 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 4/13/08 10:28 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 4/13/08 10:56 pm (UTC)no subject
Date: 4/13/08 11:00 pm (UTC)